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Abstract
Kurdological literature has been mainly limited to 
mere historical descriptive discussions characterized by 
descriptive story telling about personal/private aspects of 
Kurdish political chiefs. This study tries to provide a new 
sociological analysis based on synthetic organizational 
model to examine the process and structure of political 
movement-making and the causes of their failure in all 
around Kurdistan in the late 19th century and first half of 
20th century. Four organizational theories are employed in 
this paper: contingency, institutional, population ecology 
and resource dependency theories. In order to analyse 
the rise and demise of political movement-making in the 
late 19th century and first half of 20th century Kurdistan 
Macro level factors including exogenous factors i.e. 
the super-powers and central governments, Meso level 
factors containing socio-economic factors such as tribal-
feudalism, regionalism and religion, and Micro Level 
factors composed of illiteracy and cultural poverty were 
analysed through aforementioned organizational theories. 
Our fundamental finding is that the endogenous and 
exogenous factors have mutually caused the rise and 
demise of political movement-making. But exogenous 
factors were the final determinant in shaping, reshaping, 
directing and finally collapsing on Kurdish movements. 
Finally it should be asserted that neither exogenous 
factors nor Endogenous factors were able to meet 
Kurdish political requirements; exogenous forces were 
temporal determinants that played their role according to 
their own economic and political logic and endogenous 
forces such as tribal-feudalism, regionalism and religion 
wasted political potential in challenging with the central 
governments. 
Key words: Contemporary Kurdistan; Kurdish 
movements; Political movements; Organisational analysis  
Mohammadpur, A., Ross, N. O., & Mahmoodi, K. (2015). The 
Rise and Fall of Political Movements in the Late 19th Century 
and First Half of 20th Century Kurdistan (an Organisational 
Analysis) .  Canadian Social  Science,  11 (1),  1-16. Available 
from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/5549 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/5549
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that many studies have been conducted 
about the Kurdish society and culture in comparison with 
other ethnic groups in Iran and Middle East, most of 
socio-cultural and economic structures of this ethnicity 
still remain vague and unexplained. The dominant issue 
in these studies has been political nature and dynamics as 
if the Kurds have been the naturally born political. Both 
outsiders and insiders have ignored the other non-political 
aspects. The outsiders’ studies have focused on when and 
how the Kurdish political movement developed while the 
most of insiders concentrated on the history of Kurdish 
kings and religious aspects. 
Most researchers, who have worked on Kurdish 
political structure, in recent decades, have been outsiders 
who are not familiar with Kurdish society and culture. 
They have written about Kurdish society with political 
orientations. Their writings evolve around the tales and 
narratives of political rebels’ history and story telling 
about Kurdish political leaders. We can classify most of 
them into political history that does not reflect significant 
debates or results. Most outside researchers have 
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engaged in research without using first hand findings 
or direct observations of Kurdish culture. Even some 
of them are repetitive documentary laden with political 
data. The purpose of this paper is not to underestimate 
these works. Of course, these raw materials could be 
articulated and analysed by the various perspectives, 
but they cannot be viewed as representative of Kurdish 
Society and culture. Undoubtedly, outsider works have 
presented a distorted and ambiguous image of Kurdish 
culture, which cannot help, unless to be explained and 
refined thorough taking new approaches and comparing 
them with other studies.
Our critique focuses on internal or endogenous studies 
as well. These studies are mostly as same as the external 
or exogenous studies. Most of the internal studies have 
also been descriptive, narrative and purely historical 
and have had shortcomings similar to external ones. In 
addition, religious and court men did these studies and 
were writing about the religious, feudal-tribal issues or 
sovereignty of Kurdish kings. 
The aim of this study is to provide a new sociological 
analysis based on Synthetic organizational model to 
examine the process and structure of political movement-
making and its demise in all around Kurdistan in the late 
19th century and first half of 20th century. It also offers a 
new but critical model for further studies and proves that 
the sociological theories can be applicable to examine the 
Kurdish society at every time. 
The Kurdological literature has been mostly limited 
to historical descriptive discussion which functions as 
raw material that will be analysed sociologically and 
anthropologically in our study. Generally it could be 
claimed that the analytical literature of this area of interest 
is so limited and poor that it not possible to introduce 
any complete or comprehensive research. In addition, 
historical descriptive literature is characterized by 
descriptive story telling about personal/private behaviour, 
practices or ideas of Kurdish political chiefs. They have 
not spoken at the macro level of political context of wider 
society analytically. 
This study wants to move beyond this apparent, 
superficial and descriptive level of explanation of the 
Kurdological literature to open a new critical landscape 
for further investigations on Kurds through new theories 
and methods. Therefor, it could be a starting point, despite 
all of its shortcomings, for other researchers who look for 
a new theory or methodology about Kurds or other ethnic 
groups.
Our fundamental proposition is that the endogenous 
and exogenous factors have mutually caused the rise 
and demise of political movement-making in the late 
19th century and first half of 20th century Kurdistan. But 
exogenous factors were the final determinant. This study 
distinguishes endogenous forces from socio-economic and 
cultural context of society. The former refers to political 
forces that oriented political actions of Kurdish leaders 
but the latter refers to the general public sphere of society 
in which both endogenous and exogenous forces played 
their own role. The exogenous forces which are defined 
as external political actors and powers intervened in the 
Kurdistan region remarkably. 
This article will address the following questions that 
underlie the goals of the study:
(a) What were the greatest political movements of the 
late 19th century and first half of 20th century Kurdistan?
(b) What were the causes and nature of political 
movements in Kurdistan in that period?
(c) Did these political issues correspond with the 
general level of development in Kurdistan?
(d) What was the role of endogenous and exogenous 
factors in this case?
(e) What was the role of exogenous forces in 
historically political backwardness of Kurdish society in 
the late 19th century and first half of 20th century? What 
were their political interests?
(f) What were the weaknesses of Kurdish leaders 
during their political revolts? Why did they reach their 
demise?
(g) What is the future of the political fate of Kurdistan?
(h) Is there any socio-anthropological theoretical 
model to explain this trend?  
(i) Which indicators should this model include to make 
clear dimensions of this historical debate?
(j) What dimensions of Kurdish movements can be 
explained by organizational model of study?
1.  THEORETICAL APPROACH
Four organizational theories are employed in this paper: 
contingency, institutional, population ecology and 
resource dependency perspectives. 
1.1  Contingency Theory (CT) 
The contingency theory (CT) considers factors and causes 
that affect the organizational entity. These factors can be 
divided into internal and external conditions. This theory 
assumes that the organizations are similar to a live entity 
and it is determined by some environmental situation and 
elements. According to Lawrence and Lurch, the rate 
and amount of environmental changes can influence the 
differentiation and integration of organization. The main 
focus of this theory is to find out the degree to which the 
organizational structure was shaped to meet the needs of the 
environment and resulting tasks (Donaldson, 1996, p.69).
The CT distinguishes that in the rapidly changing 
environment, organization requires flexibility and 
adaptation and actors should apply their skills to fit with 
new positions. In this respect, Burns and Stalker maintain 
that different environmental conditions call for different 
styles of organizing (Hatch, 1996, p.77). 
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1.2  Population Ecology (PE) 
Inspired by Darwin’s natural selection theory, PE 
argues that the environment selects certain types of 
organisations to survive and others to perish based 
on the fitness between their structural characteristics 
and environmental ones. Focusing on the groups and 
populations of organizations, this theory emphasises 
the environment as a main determinant and maintains 
three organisational selection stages. Variation, selection 
and retention are fundamental postulates of this theory 
(Robbins, 1987, pp.166-167).
The organizational ecologists try to explain how 
socio-economic and political conditions affect the 
relative abundance and diversity of organisation. They 
try to account for their variation over time. In this 
respect, they assert that degree and rate of organizational 
founding and failure are key sources of increasing and 
decreasing diversity (Baum, 1996, p.77). In this theory, 
the environment of organizations is assumed to have the 
power to choose a competitor, those which meet its needs 
(Hatch, 1996, p.81).
In a similar way, according to PE, the environment is the 
final determinant in choosing organisations, which serve 
or adapt with its surroundings. But it should be made clear 
that the environment here is not used to refer in natural 
setting (as it is part of general environment), but it refers to 
a set of organizations living in the same context and strive 
to compete with each other. Finally in this theory, the role 
of individual as the manager is very central, but they cannot 
always determine or predict in advance which variations 
will succeed or change the organizational structure and 
strategies (Baum, 1996, p.79).
1.3  Institutional Theory (IT)
Many regarded Philip Selznick as the founder of IT 
who believes that organizations adapt, not only to the 
strivings of their internal groups, but also to the values 
of external society. Berger and Luckman identified 
institutionalization as a core process in the creation 
and perpetuation of enduring social groups. To realize 
institutionalization, every organization should undergo 
some paths as follows:
Habitualization involving the generation of (new) 
structural arrangements to respond to a specific 
organisational need or problem; Objectification 
involving the development of social conformity among 
organizational decision-makers and objectification of 
organisational rules in form of externality; Sedimentation 
refers to finalise the style of internalization and 
institutionalization of rules and resources of an 
organisation by their agents and actors.
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  d e p i c t s  t h e  s t a g e s  o f 
Institutionalisation. This model can be used as an 
ideal type for evaluating the processes and stages of 
institutionalization trend in all organizations.
Table 1
The Stages of Institutionalisation in Institutional Theory
Dimensions Pre-institutionalization stage Semi-institutionalization stage Full-institutionalization stage
Process Habitualization Objectification Sedimentation
Characteristics of adaptors Homogenous Heterogonous Heterogeneous
Impetuses for diffusion Imitation Imitative/normative Normative
Theorization activity None High Low
Variance in implementation High Moderate Low
Structure failure rate High Moderate Low
Note. From Tolbert & Zucker, 1996.
1.4  Resource Dependency (RD)
In contrast with PE, which draws attention towards the 
environment context in choosing the best and the fittest 
organisations to be held, RD provides a perspective of top 
management looking outward from the organization to its 
surrounding environment. In this theory the environment 
is replaced by the organization. Also the environment is a 
storage containing many materials and potentials in which 
organisation take advantage of them to their survival 
(Hatch, 1996, p.86). In this theory, in spite of depending 
of organizations on their environment as resource storage, 
the environment does not act in a way that explicates it 
as a natural selection. Managers as organisational agents 
can learn to investigate the harsh sea of environmental 
dominate on. This theory emphasizes the individual 
ability to take advantage of their environment. Therefore 
managers are able to employ environmental capacities to 
serve their organizations (Hatch, 1996, p.78).
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
The Rise and Fall of Political Movements in the Late 19th Century and 
First Half of 20th Century Kurdistan (an Organisational Analysis)
4
Figure 1
Synthetic Theoretical Model of Study
2.   THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE LATE 
19TH CENTURY AND FIRST HALF OF 20TH 
CENTURY KURDISTAN
Why have the Kurds who constitute the largest ethnic bloc 
after the Arabs, Persians and Turks in the Middle East 
were relatively late in developing a modern nationalist 
movement? The geography of the region and the nomadic 
lifestyle of Kurds for long periods strengthened the 
divergence of several Kurdish dialects. Many of them 
are not readily mutually comprehensible in political 
terms. For at least the past five hundred years, the 
Kurds have been divided between Persian and Ottoman 
Empires. These political divisions, not surprisingly, have 
seriously constrained opportunities to develop a more 
comprehensive national vision. At the same time, the 
states involved, intended to inhibit Kurdish nationalism 
within their borders  (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p.6).
At the end of 19th century, the economy of the Kurdish 
tribes was still dominated by nomadic sheep breeding, 
as Lazarev has noted. Kurdistan in that period was based 
on the traditional and tribal way of life; politically it was 
replete with multiple tribes and pastoralists who had 
their own territory and rule. Each of them dominated 
one part of the region and constituted a politically local 
sovereignty. Accordingly in socio-cultural dimension, it 
characterizes illiterate and uneducated structure. The main 
form of social organization was confined to tribe unity, 
which in turn led to create a feudal social stratification. 
Therefore it is evident that they will be prevented from an 
advent of any conscious national identity to be operated 
in the form of united government. That is why most of 
rebellions could not reach their purpose building a united 
ideology and action (White, 1998;  Jalil, 2002, p.20; 
Kendal et al., 1991, p.54). 
Although tribalism was the main feature of social 
organization among the Kurds during the nineteenth 
century, developments in the Ottoman Empire at that time 
had a profound impact on Kurdish society. Kurdish dere-
beys, or princes, who had dominated Kurdish traditional 
societies for centuries, were destroyed and Sufi and 
Sheikhs, who were more concerned with religion than 
nationalism, became the most powerful men in the region. 
These profound developments in Iraqi-Kurdistan (southern 
Kurdistan) were directly due to the implementation of 
Tanzimat (Ottoman reforms 1839-1876) in Iraq (Othman, 
1997, p.1).
Some scholars and historians have portrayed the 
Kurdistan of the late 19th century and first half of 20th 
century as Feudal Kurdistan in which all of socio-
economic and political relationships were produced and 
reproduced by Feudalist mode of production. Despite 
of being a traditional society, there was a great deal of 
progress and advancement in some social dimension. 
The culture and economy were expanded considerably 
and some appropriate conditions were created for 
Kurds. It was in this period that there appeared several 
achievements in Northern Kurdistan in literature, art 
and poetry. For example cities such as Jazire, Betlis 
and Hakkari became Kurdistan academic centres. Some 
historians call 19th century as the golden age of Kurdish 
people in which the traditional Kurdish society was 
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experiencing a great onward transformation in its own 
structure. But it should be said that this region was not 
united territorially and politically (Kendal et al., 1991, 
p.36, 53). 
Parallel with the emergence of the Safavieh dynasty 
in Iran, the entire Kurdistan was only a part of Iran. After 
coming to throne, the Safavieh government made its 
first war with the Ottoman Empire in Chaldoran region. 
About two third of Kurdistan region was annexed to the 
Ottoman Empire. During this period that lasted more 
than a century, both Safavieh and Ottoman competing 
gave Kurds political privileges and economic grants 
to encourage them to be annexed to either of them. It 
was why the Kurds established some semi-independent 
regional sovereignty (Senjagh) in Iran and Ottoman and 
take advantage of this political opportunity. After the 
collapse of Safavieh and advent of Qajar dynasty, this 
situation continued for Kurds to some extent, but the new 
governments of Qajar and Ottoman did not want Kurds to 
have any dependent political arrangement. Both of them 
tried to limit and somehow destroy these Kurdish semi-
states in Iran and Ottoman.
These governments sought to constitute centralised 
states, which can unify all of their ethnic groups into a 
united and powerful system. It was precisely at that time 
that there were several socio-political movements against 
central government by Kurds to restore previous ethnical 
semi-states. The most important of them were Sheikh 
Obeidolla Nahri in Ottoman in 1880, Sheikh Mahmood 
Barzenji (after the Ottoman collapse), Smaeil Agh Simko 
in Iran in 1921, Sheikh said Piran in Turkey in 1925 and 
later Qazi Mohammad revolt which led to creation of 
the Mahabad Republic in Iran in 1946 (Molla Omar Isa, 
2001, p.42). The Ottoman Empire was collapsing. There 
were many factors responsible for its destruction such as 
political intervention of Ottoman in internal and ethnical 
affairs of Kurds, its disability to adopt the industrial 
revolution and the technological elements of the West, 
preservation of a great number of armies without any 
financial resources and the land–system of this time. 
Moreover, the lack of ethnical and religious tolerance 
led to the collapse of Ottoman Empire in twentieth 
century. Also in Iran under the Qajar dynasty, many 
factors were responsible for Kurdish revolts. One of 
the most important of them was political pressure on 
Kurdish semi-states to be integrated into a centralised 
political system.  Moreover, Qajar dynasty endeavoured to 
convince Kurdish tribal leaders to be dominated by Iranian 
government (Kendal, 1991, p.47). Qajar government, 
despite its political weaknesses and its dependence on the 
ethnic power to hold their government, was attempting 
to mix Kurds in their political system. Sometimes they 
got married with the tribe’s landlord’s girls and created 
kin relationships with them to take advantage of their 
tribal supports. The final purpose of Qajar government 
was to integrate not only Kurds but also all ethnic groups 
as a united political entity. They tried to realize this idea 
by every possible means ranging from making familial 
kinship to forceful strategies (McDowall, 2002, p.41).
In this  era ,  there  were many chal lenges and 
strives among Kurdish tribes to obtain territorial and 
economic-political interests from Qajar government. 
These challenges and strives were supported by Qajar 
government in order to prevent their unity. On the other 
hand, they had another kind of quarrel with each other to 
take possession of grass, live stocks or land. Occasionally 
they were stimulated to fight together with the central 
government. The tribal quarrels between Mangoor and 
Mamash tribes of Mahabad, the plundering and killing 
of Armenian people by Shikak tribes, tribal revolts in 
Kermanshah province are only a few examples of tribal 
disturbance in Iranian Kurdistan (McDowall, 2002, pp.41, 
42, 45,150-151).
By the end of nineteenth century, a new socio-
political condition, The Constitutional Revolution, 
emerges in Iran in which Kurds did not take part in large 
numbers. Therefore they remained as a marginalized 
ethnic group in the later political climate in Iran. The 
Constitutional Revolution in Iran prepared a historical 
starting-point to create a democratic social entity in which 
Kurds could follow their political interests without any 
political movements but they did not do so. In following, 
brief discussion on Iranian society in the period of 
Constitutional Revolution and role of Kurds in this 
revolutionary context is presented.
3.  CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (CR) 
AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONTEXT FOR 
EMERGING POLITICAL ACTION IN IRAN
The twentieth century brought the profound and striking 
conditions not only to Iranian Kurds but also to political 
orientation in Iran. The advent of CR later enthroning 
of Reza Shah in Iran in parallel with Ottoman Empire 
collapse in the Middle East has been the important macro-
socio-economic transformations in which Kurds could 
declare their existence. These changes and the conditions 
that led to these changes were culminated in some socio-
political, in particular, tribal revolts among Kurds. Sheikh 
Obeidolla Nahri in Ottoman in 1880, Sheikh Mahmood 
Barzenji (after the Ottoman collapse), Smaeil Agh Simko 
in Iran in 1921, Sheikh said Piran in Turkey in 1925, 
later Qazi Mohammad in Iran in 1946, and finally Molla 
Mustafa Barzani were most important revolts in the range 
of less than a century. It may be better to have a glance on 
Kurdistan under CR and also political role and positions 
of Kurds in this great movement. The CR has been a 
key context for political Movement-making in Iran even 
in the contemporary period and also it could serve to 
shape a political/national ideology of Kurds. Therefore, 
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these contemporary movements are described, and then 
the parallel movements of Turkey and Iraqi Kurds are 
addressed in brief.  
Undoubtedly, many socio-political movements have 
existed in the long history of Iran, but most of them cannot 
be called movements in the real meaning, because they 
had not enough indices to be referred to as a movement. 
Historically and more evidently, the political movements 
in Iran were to some extent tribal or peasantry but the late 
19th century was historically a key period to prepare some 
foundations for political-Movement making in Iran.
Some historians and sociologists emphasize that the 
CR was stimulated by some reformists and intellectuals 
who were aware of the liberal/democratic and political-
social systems of Western society. In this case, it should 
be asserted that CR was the first socio-political movement 
in Iranian history that aimed to exert law and replace 
absolute state with democratic one (Katouzian, 2002, 
p.52). The CR was an urban rebellion against the state, 
in which, the Iranian intellectuals and educated people 
participated and they believed that most of Ulama are their 
supporters. The CR occurred when Qajar government was 
weak and unstable to resist internal challenges. Despite 
the participation of the majority of society parts, after their 
relative achievement, none of political parties accepted to 
cooperate with each other and to manage general problems 
stemming from the CR. Traditional challenges came to 
birth and negative political competitions began to extend. 
Therefore, it is not wonderful that CR couldn’t survive 
more than a few years after its beginning (Katouzian, 
2002, p.158).
So far, the formation and nature of CR have been 
briefly discussed. Here, the main questions are “What 
was the role of Iranian Kurds?” and “What was their 
political position and orientation?”  In the age of CR, 
economically, Kurdistan was grounded in agro-ranching/
substantive economic structure, except some regions 
such as Sannandaj, Kermanshah, Mahabad and some 
other parts. There wasn’t any urban area in which Middle 
class emerges. On other hand, Kurdish landlords who 
had their common interests in co-operating with Qajar 
government were against CR so as to preserve their 
traditional resources of wealth and power. Generally 
the traditional structure of Kurdistan in that period 
did not permit Kurds culturally and socially to enter 
this political struggle. In this case, Kasravy says “the 
Kurdish tribe chiefs retained their relationships with 
despotic adherence and protected Qajar government to 
repress revolutionary agents” (Borzouei, 1999, pp.115-
130). Despite this fact that Tehran had political centrality 
to guide and direct CR and revolutionary agents, the new 
Constitutional Government sent many representatives to 
other regions of Iran to propagate revolutionary ideology 
and this issue demonstrated the national character of the 
movement. But Kurdistan seemed not to be affected by it 
(Digar, 1998, p.34). 
The question is “Why did the Kurds not want to take 
part in CR?” It could have been a historical opportunity 
for Kurds to enter into civil/political discourse and to 
build political parties without trying to begin any civil war 
with their government that started after Reza Shah came 
to throne for less than one century. Abase Vali, in this 
respect points out that one of the reasons that Kurds did 
not participate in the CR was this fact that the hyper-class 
of Kurds, merchants and traders familiar with reformation 
and development through trade relationships with Russia 
and Ottoman were so few that they were not able to 
support and advocate ideas of CR. As Vali asserts rightly 
Kurdish society, in contrast with Turkish counterpart 
lacked a matured intellectual class to accept and spread 
any revolutionary ideology. 
In contrast with Abase Vali, McDowall argues that the 
Kurds tended to escape from Qajar. Therefore, in some 
urban centres such as Mahabad, Urumiyeh, Sannandaj 
and Kermanshah some political activities were organized 
in coordination with CR, but the opponents of CR were 
Kurdish chiefs and landlords who feared to lose their 
own interests. The tribe chiefs were considered as an 
inseparable component of the governmental system. In 
general, as McDowall asserts, tribal chiefs disagreed 
both with CR and increasing political and economic 
interventions of Qajarieh government in their regions 
(McDowall, 2002, p.54). It shows that their only interest 
was even beyond any political transformations whether in 
Iran or Kurdistan. 
In another analysis, the feudalism and tribalism as 
macro historical characteristics of Kurdish society have 
acted to prevent this movement to flourish in Kurdistan. 
To explain factors affecting the non-participation of 
Kurds in CR, some additional factors such as cultural 
and economic poverty, and relative illiteracy should be 
taken into account. In spite of the role of such socio-
economic and political obstacles in falling of CR 
ideology in Kurdistan, the role of tribe-feudalism as a 
key part of political/historical structure of Kurdistan was 
more important and considerable in comparison with 
other dimensions. It was this sub-structure that retarded 
Kurdistan and provided a close society that was not able 
to adopt new conditions of the modern world as it is today. 
The Kurds have not been and still are not united. 
In general, the history of Kurds indicated the existence 
of multiple factors that could impact on the formation and 
production of political ideology in Kurdistan. In our case, 
we believe that there were some obstacles leading to non-
participation of Kurdish in CR as following:
(a) In the historical area: tribal-feudalism in parallel 
with external intervention
(b) In cultural area: illiteracy and cultural poverty
(c) In socio-political area: feudalistic stratification and 
tribe-based political system 
(d) In economic area: agro-ranching based substantive 
economy.
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In addition, we should add some modifiers as important 
determinants in this process such as ethnic identity. Kurds 
conceived themselves as a separated and distinctive ethnic 
in identity and religion. Therefore they did not tend to 
step toward co-operating with Iranian society. That was 
why the Kurds were, to some extent, as partial or marginal 
agents in most of socio-political movements of Iran.
Finally, the CR was beaten by government and after 
a few years, Iran entered into a new dynasty, which was 
dominated by Reza Shah, a founder of Pahlavi dynasty. 
Iranian society and especially Kurdistan was replete with 
socio-political disturbances in this period. Reza Shah 
came to the throne by serious support of the United States 
and Britain. Initially Reza Shah began to conduct some 
general reforms imitated or inspired by Western societies 
that led to the emergence of several rural-urban revolts. 
In that period, most parts of Iranian society still were 
traditional and incapable of new political transformation, 
which was practised by Reza Shah. The Iranian economic 
structure was still based on the three modes of productions 
i.e. agriculture, pastorals and limited sector of trade. 
The pastorals were about more than 0.35 of society 
(Foran, 1999).The traditional economic system of Iran 
evidently represented incapability and non-necessity of 
the reforms done by Reza Shah. The reformist actions 
done by Reza Shah such as extension of Western cloths, 
creating compulsory military-service, making sedentary 
of pastorals or compulsory decamping were imposed by 
three main instruments i.e. new-constituted and regulated 
Army, Curt and Bureaucracy (Abrahamian, 1998; Digar, 
1998). During this period, there occurred many socio-
political revolts/movements in Iranian Kurdistan. In 
following section, it is tried to outline and explain the 
most important of them, namely, Smaeil Agha Simko 
movement.
As a starting-point to explain Kurdistan Political 
system, it should be mentioned that this society was 
politically composed of two main sub-systems; i.e. Feudal 
sub-system and religious sub-system. The former as 
political economic mode of production was grounded to 
power and wealth and the latter, as socio-cultural model 
of integration was grounded on public structure and mass 
ideas. These two sub-systems had a mutual relationship 
for their survival. In this context, most of political leaders 
of Kurdistan belonged to one or both of two above 
categories as it is shown in the following chart: 
Table 2
Main Characteristics of Some Political Movements in Contemporary Kurdistan
Main leaders Feudal subsystem Religious subsystem
Sheikh Obeidollah (Ottoman Kurdistan) - +
Skeikh Mahmood (Iraqi Kurdistan) - +
Simko (Iranian Kurdistan) + -
Sheikh Said Piran (Turkish Kurdistan) - +
Qazi Mohammad (Iranian Kurdistan) + +
4.  REZA SHAH AND SMAEIL AGHA 
SIMKO: BETWEEN TRIBALISM AND 
QUASI-NATIONALISM
During 1920s-1930s, the political situation of Kurdistan 
was intensely influenced by Pahlavi government. The 
Pahlavi government was so powerful, at the beginning 
of emergence that it imposed its impact on the Kurdistan 
region by force. In this respect, the urgent action was to 
repress the feudal and local forces and to prevent paths of 
tribe’s migrations. The Pahalavi state arranged to settle 
down them in rural or urban centres. The most important 
factor in this process which was employed for first time, 
was new technological instrument of war weapon by 
which Reza Shah could dominate himself on the pastoral 
system of Iran as it was used to defeat the Kurd pastorals 
of Sahneh (McDowall, 2002, p.372). Of course some 
historians consider Reza Shah’s actions as positive and 
have admired his political actions as to improve Iranian 
traditional society and his forcedly efforts to enter Iran 
into new modern world. They indicate to his positive 
reforms as unprecedented in Iranian history such as, 
settling of pastorals, constitution of schools, promoting 
trade and industry by creating roads and railways, 
cancelling of capitulation privilege etc.. (Digar, 1998, 
p.86)
By contrast, in spite of Reza Shah’s positive actions, 
there are many historians and scholars who think of 
Reza Shah Period as a closed system to any freedom 
and improvement. According to Abrahamian, during 
Reza Shah Rule every effort toward political Movement-
making was forbidden and there was no room for freedom 
and public view, but despite his actions, there existed 
many parties. In sum his political actions were oscillating 
between reformism and repressing (Abrahamian, 1998, 
p.169).
At the beginning of Pahlavi government in 1920s, 
Iranian Kurdistan was replete with tribes and pastoralist 
nomads who had their own territory. They rebel against 
Reza Shah. In this period, the most important movement 
was of Simko. Let me outline his political career and 
goals and then try to explain whether his revolts can be 
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assessed as a national movement or mere tribal rebellion. 
Smaeil Agha Simko was the chief of tribal confederation 
of Shikak in West Azerbaijan Province as second great 
confederation after Ardalan. In May 1919, Britain, 
anxious to restore calmness, seems to have favoured the 
appointment of Simko as Governor of Urumiyeh, an 
action that in the government view would have made West 
Azarbaijan as an independent province. Under pressure 
from Britain, the Iranian authorities agreed in July to a 
settlement that recognized Simko as warden of certain 
highways in the locality and of the frontier districts of 
Dilman and Lahijan (McDowall, 2002, p.374). After his 
appointment, Simko started to plunder villages and even 
some urban regions of West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. 
It seems that Simko’s actions were not taken seriously 
by central government and it appears that it was one 
of the factors for Simko to be reinforced militarily and 
politically. Simko was supporting by many northern 
Kurdistan tribes such as Harki, Mamash, Mangoor and 
Pejdari (Borzoei, 1999, p.211). During his rule on the 
West Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, he plundered a lot of 
Kurdish cities such as Mahabad, Baneh, Saqez, Urumiyeh 
and other regions. Some scholars maintain that the nature 
and process of Simko’s rebel can be summarized in 
this brief statement: “Creation of disorder, stealing and 
plundering of people’s properties and assets, killing them 
and effort to build feudal system”.
Also about Simko’s plundering, Ali Azizi writes: “After 
getting five thousand tomans from Lakestan and Ghara 
Geshlagh people, he desisted from his tournaments, but 
after a short time, he messaged them, that if they do not 
send him enough bullets and also their guns with some 
of their chiefs, he will annihilate all of them including 
children and women”. In addition, Mehrdad Izady 
describes Simko as a brutal man and says: “Simko can be 
compared with the cruelest people in the world in brutality 
and cruelty” (Ahmadi, 1999, p.252).
Simko’ rebel had two characteristics which of course 
led to his annihilation; Requisition of West Azarbaijan, 
Kurdistan and Armenian territory and assets and insistence 
on this matter that these regions should be managed by 
him. In his meeting in 1921, he deceitfully told Mustafa 
Pasha:
At this time, there is not any political organization in Kurdistan. 
I am the only person in the whole who rules on it. I have no will 
to be leader of it but about the flag and something like this, I do 
not need them. (Kochera, 1994, p.65) 
There are several opinions about the nature and 
purpose of Simko’s movement. Bruinessen simply think of 
Simko’s plundering as a way for tax-gathering to manage 
his army i.e. he was just trying to manage his army 
financially. Our question is that, if Simko was the national 
leader of Kurds, as Bruinessen simply thinks, then why 
he plundered Mahabad and other Kurdish regions and 
their assets, and killed hundreds and thousands of Kurds? 
As Abdollah Nahid says, “Simko was nothing but short 
of Qajarian government in sedition and destruction of 
Kurdish properties and assets.” If Simko was really 
intended to build a united Kurdistan, why he did not try 
to improve situation of poor-farmers and provide them 
with security condition to revive agriculture and livestock 
which were key elements for Kurdistan development? 
Why he attempted to annihilate economic structure of 
West and East Azerbaijan by pressuring people to escape 
from these regions. In this respect Asan Aref says:
When we took possession of Razaeieh (Urumiyeh) in 1921 
again, a lot of people came to welcome us, only about four 
to five thousand have survived from its 25,000 population 
of this region, rest of them had been killed or escaped from 
there, before our attack. They had been attacked by Armenians, 
then by Kurds. More than three hundred villages have been 
eradicated. It took many years to make it inhabitable and to 
flourish agriculture and ranching.  (Borzoei, 1999,  p.222)
Many interpretations have been offered about Simko’s 
revolt by Outsider and Insider scholars. Nadir Entesar 
maintains that Simko’s movement was the first one, which 
was created by Kurds to constitute a united government. 
But Bruinessen recognizes it as national action, although 
it was not so different form usual tribal revolts. Also 
McDowall argues that Simko’s nationalism had more 
economic dimension than ethnical one. In contrast and 
rightly, Abbas Vali truly considers it as a tribal rebellion 
and a kind of political stubbornness. In his perspective, 
it was Reza Shah who treated it as a national movement, 
while Simko’s rebellion essentially was just tribal (Olson, 
2001, p.40).
About nature and origins of his rebellion, we precisely 
agree with Abbas Vail’s idea who maintains that Simko’s 
ideology was tribal but Pahalavi government took it 
into account as a national issue. Moreover, we think that 
Simko’s ideology can be put between tribal-feudalism 
and quasi-nationalism. When Iranian society was entering 
into modern structure of the political system by Reza 
Shah, it was evident that there would be several tribal and 
quasi-nationalism revolts to restore their territory, feudal 
and quasi-national interests. Simko’s movement was one 
of them. Of course, there existed many other rebellions 
in Kurdistan, such as Amar Pasha and Molla Khalil in 
Sardasht and another parts of Kurdistan but they could not 
expand their political scope (Mohammadpur, 2001).
Simko was defeated in his plan, because he lacked 
public legitimation and characteristics required to be 
accepted among masses of Kurds, Simko was appointed 
by the British to meet their political interests during his 
period. In one hand, he introduced himself as a national 
leader and on the other hand his actions demonstrated him 
as a brutal Killer.
In Iran, after resignation of Reza Shah, there existed 
a kind of democracy and the public sphere like what 
had occurred during the constitutional revolution but 
there emerged disorders and anomies among the tribes 
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and counties. British penetration in Iran for oil interests 
integrated Iranian people during Reza Shah Period. But 
it did not mean that there were no tribe-state conflicts 
(Katozian, 2002, p.34). After Reza Shah, Kurds in south-
north Kurdistan began to revolt and Russia’s support of 
Azerbaijan separation provided Kurds with an exceptional 
opportunity to build a nationalistic ideology for creating 
the first political movement in Kurdistan and constituting 
the first Kurdish government in the Middle East. It was 
in this period that many Kurdish tribal chiefs were able to 
return from their banishment period by British financial 
and political support. Mohammad Rashid Baneh and 
Mahmood Khan Dezeli, were among of these chiefs 
(Borzoei, 1999, p.271).
It is true that the Reza Shah’s period was a decline 
time of tribal and pastoralist systems. But as some 
historians such as Digar say, “His period was the starting 
point to Iranian modernization and he impels Iran toward 
civilization.” He further adds, 
Ending of Reza Shah period caused revival of communist 
and nationalist political movement. Undoubtedly, Reza Shah 
cruelly repressed tribes and made the Iranian social structure to 
be modernized but in all, his contribution to development and 
modernization of Iran can not be ignored. (Digar, 1998, pp.123-
124)
So far we have discussed about Simko’s movement as 
a most important rebellion of Iranian Kurds in the Reza 
Shah period. But it is clear that there were other small 
movements such as Amar Pasha and Molla Khalil in 
Sardasht but we will not discuss them here. By the end 
of Reza Shah’s Period, we look at the Mohammad Reza 
Shah period and also Kurdish movements at that time. The 
Mahabad Republic was the key and important movement 
in that period which we will focus on in the next section.
5.  MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH AND THE 
MAHABAD REPUBLIC
Although the bureaucracy, court and army were three 
important foundations of Pahlavi period, Mohammad 
Reza Shah, in contrast with his father (Reza Shah), was 
seeking to create a fourth foundation: a non-movement 
state. Kingdom System, Constitutionalism and Revolution 
were three political goals of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
The political system of Iran under Mohammad Reza 
Shah could be best described as “politics of system 
preservation” (Abrahamian, 1998, pp.239-403). The 
features most characteristic of Iranian Bureaucracy period 
were centralisation of decision-making and frequent 
displacement of political appointees. Of course, as it 
is clear Iran under Reza Shah was undergoing through 
modern period. It was weak and damageable and 
therefore, the tribal and feudal rebellions could imperil 
Reza Shah Government. This political system was 
empowered and integrated during Mohammed Reza Shah 
period. He followed his father’s plans and expanded his 
power to create public sphere. The political system of 
Iran under MR was more flexible and coherent than Reza 
Shah’s. 
But the occupation of Iran in 1940 was a starting-point 
for Soviet in north and British in the south. Penetration 
of Soviet in southern counties of Iran including West 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan has had a long-term political 
tradition. USSR was supporting Azarians and Kuds to be 
independent. This traditional position remained throughout 
the MR period. It was under Russian impact that Iranian 
Kurdish movements took communist orientation. USSR 
had great influence on the formation of political parties 
and its goal was to struggle for emancipation and freedom 
of under-classes. Ezbe Komala founded by Sheikh 
Mahmood Barzenji in 1938, Ezbe Hiwa by Rafigh Elmi 
in1939, Ezbe Komala JK by Qazi Mohammad in 1942 
and Rezgari in 1948 were parties which were inspired 
by communist ideology of Russia and thus had not their 
roots in the local, regional or historical context of Kurdish 
social life. Therefore as we will turn to it, The USSR and 
UK roles in political Movement-making of Kurdistan 
should be considered as critical (Moll, 2001, p.83). 
Let’s discuss Kurdish political activities in MR period. 
The most important political movement of Kurds was 
an effort to constitute an independent Kurdish state. 
But this aim was very onerous and difficult. McDowall 
believes that the impulse of Kurdish ethnic nationalism 
first found full expression In Iran where the Kurds were 
weaker than in either Iraq or Turkey. This condition 
was created by World War II, which resulted in political 
weakness and power vacuum in Iranian political system 
(McDowall, 2002, p.395). In this period the Mahabad 
Republic was founded and stabilized by Qazi Mohammad; 
the landlord and Judge of Mahabad. Qazi Mohammad 
was accepted as the leader of Komala which had less 
communist orientation at first and was trying to contact 
with Azerbaijan Movement (Digar, 1998, p.131). Soviet 
invited Qazi Mohammad and thirty of his followers to 
travel to Bakoo. In this travel the Kurd’s representatives 
were stimulated to pronounce the independent Kurdistan. 
Qazi Mohammad, during his career as a leader of 
Movement of Kurdistan, had many travels to Soviet to 
observe communist progresses. But he did not accept to 
be integrated with Azerbaijan (McDowall, 2002, p.402; 
Digar, 1998, p.131). Since Russia was influencing the 
northern Iran, it was encouraging Azarians and Kurds 
to form separate states. This action pressured Iran to 
grant Russia some oil privileges. In fact the Kurds were 
economic exchange instruments by which USSR could 
obtain its interests (McDowall, 2002, p.409). Indeed, 
it was the British-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 that 
led to movements including the declaration of the so-
called “the Mahabad Republic” in early 1946 and had 
not their roots in the local, regional or historical context 
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of Kurdish social life. Therefore it is not surprising that 
after Iran crisis ended, in parallel with Soviet withdrawal 
from Iran in May, Mahabad regime and its twin in Tabriz 
(Azerbaijan) were doomed and both fell in late 1946 
(Muller, 2000, p.1). 
6.  QAZI MOHAMMAD, COMMUNIST 
IDEOLOGY AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
Undoubtedly Qazi Mohammad sought to build an 
independent Kurdistan, but his biggest mistake was to 
count on foreign countries particularly Soviet. His travel 
to Soviet to familiarise with its development and progress 
under communist ideology motivated him to welcome 
this ideology as emancipatory and also progressive. He 
tended to adopt this kind of government as a model to 
operate in Kurdistan but finally he did not succeed. The 
following words express his tendency to Soviet model of 
government. He Says: 
In Soviet there are various ethnic groups and nations who are 
living in this large territory which had not any mutual and 
positive interactions in the past but thanks to Russian revolution 
and governmental aids they have gained freedom and equality. 
They are undergoing development and advancement in all 
dimensions and they have reached to a cultural, civilization and 
economic stage that has not been seen before. (Borzoei, 1999, 
p.322)
Marxist political model which was accepted by Qazi 
Mohammad stimulated Iranian government reactions. 
Prime Minister, Ahmad Ghavam, prevented communist 
penetration and simultaneously opposed Kurdistan 
Democratic Movement. He constituted the Todeh 
Movement and ramified it into all Iranian provinces. Until 
that time Iran was not able to fight with Mahabad Republic 
explicitly because USSR was supporting it (Digar, 1998, 
p.132). In return Qazi Mohammad promised Soviet to 
allow their interference in Kurdistan. Also, Moscow tried 
to encourage Kurdish leaders to segregate from Iran and 
furthermore attempted to unite Azerbaijan and Kurdistan 
regions. Qazi Mohammad tended to spread his ideology 
to Southern Kurdistan and Kermanshah province as well. 
Therefore, the Iranian government attempted to restrain 
southern tribes to join Mahabad movement because it was 
a big danger for Iran if Qazi Mohammad could justify 
Kurdish tribes to joint him (Borzoei, 1999, p.347). Then, 
central government decided to give Russia some more 
oil grants to prevent it from intervening in northern Iran. 
Therefore, since Soviet was able to attain its oil interests, 
it was disinterested to Kurdish goals and fate. Rahim 
Qazi in his interview with Qazi Mohammad wrote: “Qazi 
Mohammad, trusted to Soviet till latest moments”, it 
shows his loyalty to Soviet policies along with his efforts 
to constitute a society based on the Soviet political pattern 
(Mahdavi, 2001, p.321). Soviet helped Qazi to find MR 
and promoted Molla Mustafa Barzai as General of Qazi 
Mohammad’s army and dressed his soldiers by Soviet 
uniform (Mahdavi, 2001, p.107). After Soviet withdrawal 
from Iran, following their agreement, Iranian government 
could attack MR and destroyed this local state. Barzai 
escaped and Qazi were arrested and were hanged in 1946 
in Mahabad. This political action unmasked Soviet role in 
rise and fall of the most important Kurdish movement in 
that century. Economic interest versus national autonomy 
was the hallmark of MR and it can be a critical point to 
predict future political activities of Kurds. About the key 
role of Soviet in Kurdistan, Barzai who was the military 
leader of MR says in a very interesting statement: “It was 
not Kurds and Qazi who were defeated by Mohammad 
Reza Shah (Iran) but it was Soviet that was beaten by 
the U.S” (Kochera, 1994, p.225). USSR oscillation in its 
politics toward Kurds affected Kurdish socio-political life 
dramatically. But overall there have been many defects 
that led to collapse of the Mahabad Republic: 
(a) Non-realisation of Soviet aids and its intensification 
supports Kurds.
(b) Opposition of tribes and landlords of southern 
Kurdistan.
(c) Weakness of Democratic Movement to interact with 
masses and its limit to northern Kurdistan particularly in 
Mahabad as Abdolla Pejdari says: 
The Democratic Movement of Iranian Kurdistan did not have 
enough activists among the farmer and labour class. It had 
not taken any sufficient steps to organise and involve them in 
revolutionary struggles. No movement will be able to resist 
against political and militaristic threat unless they are based on 
the local and endogenous foundation.
(d) Role of Hama Rashid Baneh, who was appointed as 
the governor and leader of Bookan by Qazi Mohammad. 
Then he escaped to Iraq without Qazi Mohammad’s 
consent. Hamid Moemeni declares: “At the beginning of 
declaration of MR, Hama Rashid who was a British spy 
was tending to debilitate it”. He also speaks about some 
documents, which prove his contact with British and 
Soviet. Hama Rashid who was the chief of Baneh, during 
this period killed and burned Baneh and Saqez inhabitants. 
He betrayed Qazi Mohammad and fled to Iraq. Britain 
tried to employ him to conspire against Mosaddeq as well 
(Prime Minister of Iran) but was not successful (Borzoei, 
1999).
In general, the MR can be described as a product of 
exogenous and politically motivated movement. To some 
extent, it was a political game between Iran and Soviet. 
Mehrdad Izady correctly writes: “In fact, the Mahabad 
Republic was created by Soviet occupation forces which 
constituted the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan as 
well. It is vain if we think that the Mahabad Republic 
could survive after Soviet withdrawal from Iran” (Ahmadi, 
1999, p.314).  
The events of this period explain the circumstances 
upon which foreign politics were made. The MR emerged 
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when Iran was not only politically and militarily weak but 
also when Shah did not intend to assign any economic-oil 
grants to Soviet. After the insurance of Soviet interests in 
Iran, along with the U.S pressures on the Soviet, MR was 
annihilated by Iranian government. On the one hand, MR 
can be considered as an external-oriented movement but 
on the other hand it expressed the Kurdish efforts to obtain 
their historical right. But the point is that the dependence 
on foreign aids and exogenous forces that have shaped 
Kurdish nationalism had been key historical features of all 
movements in this period. Now it would be better to look 
at another part of Kurdistan: Turkish Kurdistan which had 
been pioneer in political movements and most of Iranian 
and Iraqi Kurdish movements have been inspired by it.
7.  TURKEY: KURDISH NATIONALISM, 
POLITICAL MOVEMENT: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
In fact all the Kurdish political movements are rooted in 
the period when the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end 
of the First World War. However many educated Kurds, 
albeit a small proportion of the whole Kurdish population, 
were inspired by the idea of a Kurdish national entity. 
An opportunity to give this idea a form arose when the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed in the post-war period of 1918-
1922 but proved unsuccessful (McDowall, 1991, p.295).
From the 1920s onwards, Turkey as a product of 
Ottoman collapse, Iraq and Iran had embarked upon 
policies designated to transform their ethnically mixed 
populations into cohesive civil nation. It is true that there 
were by the early 1920s Kurdish nationalists among 
the educated class and there existed Kurdish nationalist 
associations with different regional backgrounds and 
religious affiliations. However, their influence among the 
Kurdish population at large was quite limited unless they 
allied themselves with religious and regional authorisation 
(Bruinessen, 1998). In fact it could be strongly asserted 
that tribal and religious motivation of Kurdish movement 
has been determinant not only in Iranian Kurdistan 
but also in Turkey. Of course the Turkish Kurds ethnic 
assimilation after the fall of the  Ottoman Empire which 
was characterised by violent and intense oppression is 
very different from moderate and soft ethnic assimilation 
and oppression in Iran. After the First World War, which 
resulted in Ottoman destruction and change of political 
boundaries of the Middle East, there occurred some 
political events that ranged from the declaration of 
independent Kurdistan to political revolts. In the next part 
of paper, we will outline critical points of these historical 
trends. 
Until 19th century, the Kurdistan social formation 
was called feudal Kurdistan, the feudal context of social 
life created a tribal social system. The feudalism was a 
key determinant of social stratification. As a mode of 
production, feudalism constituted farming and herding 
based economic structure and the illiterate society. The 
tribalism prevented to provide a national awareness. 
Therefore tribal feudalism was a big barrier to Kurdish 
movement progress. But it appeared that there was an 
appropriate mutual interaction between the Kurds and 
Ottoman. By the end of 19th century and early twentieth 
century there emerged many political issues that led to 
collapse of Ottoman. Ottoman was experiencing kind of 
destruction and finally it collapsed in 20th century (Kendal, 
1991).
When the  Ottoman Empire collapsed after Second 
World War, the Kurdish political and territorial fate 
became a regional and national problem that they had to 
solve it urgently. Therefore, the Coalition Forces tried 
to penetrate in the region and it was the result of their 
political action, which culminated in new division of 
the Middle East. Thus, on August10th 1920, a political 
commission was erected by Britain, France and Italy that 
determined the fate of Kurdistan. They were responsible 
for the establishment of Kurdish independent government 
in six months. 
This commission approved an agreement, the so-called 
“Sever Agreement” upon which the Kurds must have their 
own political system. But this plan remained unperformed 
and none of mentioned countries stepped forward to 
practice program of “Sever Agreement”. Finally in July 
24th 1923, the Kurdistan region was divided among Syria, 
Iraq and Turkey. In “Lozano Agreement”, the Kurds were 
negotiated without their presence (Molla, 2001). About 
the Sever Agreement (SA) we maintain that it was a plan 
to delay Kurdish nationalist movements. During the SA, 
coalition forces promised Kurds to stabilise them by 
autonomous government but after coming to agreement 
with regional forces, they sold ethnical identity of Kurds 
for economic-oil interests. There were several factors 
that broke SA and put into practice “Lozano Agreement”. 
Some of can be summarized as follow:
(a) Solution of Kurd’s problem would lead to be solved 
most of the issues in Middle East. Therefore, there would 
have been no pretexts or justification to the intervention 
of super-powers in the region.
(b) The Kurdistan region could dominate over its oil 
resources. Therefore, super-powers could not obtain their 
economic interest easily.
(c) The division of Kurdistan was giving cause to 
retain convulsions that was helping super-powers to 
intervene in the Middle East countries.
(d) Iraq, Turkey and Syria gave some economic and 
political grants to foreign countries to conceal “Sever 
Agreement”.
(e) Creation of Kurdish united political system may 
have resulted in rebellions of other ethnics and minorities 
of Middle East and may have imperilled regional and 
national security.
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(f) The independent Kurdish government might have 
endangered interests of super-powers by dismissing its 
political relationship with them.
(g) Super-powers feared of Kurdistan to be militarily 
empowered as it could create political difficulties for them 
to follow their intentions.
Britain aimed to create one or several  semi-
independent governments with unstable political nature. 
About the Turkish Kurdistan, it was why Britain was 
sometimes creating a local government and raising 
somebody as local and regional leader of Kurdistan 
(Kendal, 1991).
After division of Kurdistan among three countries of 
Middle East, there were several movements in the regions. 
But the important issue is that these movements in these 
countries were socio-politically interrelated. At first, the 
role of exogenous factors in conducting and destructing 
them should be known and evaluated as have mentioned 
about Iranian Kurdistan movements. Although, we do 
not tend to deny the role of Kurdish people in political 
movements in Kurdistan but it could be claimed that 
foreign countries such as Britain and the United States 
guided the Turkish and Iraqi movements remarkably. 
For example, Russia was fermenting trouble and unrest 
amongst Kurdish tribes in the Ottoman period at the end 
of 19th century by encouraging them to challenge Ottoman 
authority. More recently in 1945 the Soviet encouraged 
the establishment of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabad in Iran. In the 1960s both Israel and the U.S 
encouraged the Kurds of Iraq to rebel against Baghdad 
and at the time of negotiations between 1970 and 1974, 
they were supporting Barzani and helped to re-arm him in 
the case of failure of the negotiations (McDowall, 1991). 
In what follows we will have glance at the most important 
movements of Turkish Kurdistan in the late 19th century. 
8.  SHEIKH OBEIDOLLAH’S MOVEMENT 
AND THE  OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Sheikh Obeidollah Nahri’s revolt, in 1880, was the 
latest Kurdish revolt before the collapse of the  Ottoman 
Empire. He belonged to Naghshbandi Sheikhes, the most 
powerful and influential religious sect of Ottoman that 
spread in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Sheikh Obeidollah 
rose against Ottoman penetration in Kurdish emirates 
and tended to attack Iran as well. The  Ottoman Empire 
decided to appoint Turks in the Kurdish regions and 
it was an important factor to rise against Ottoman. 
Naghshbandieh sect, which Obeidollah was one of its 
powerful chief, in spite of weakness of Kurdish Emirate 
(States), retained their traditional power and authority of 
the First World War (Kendal, 1991). 
In 1880, Sheikh Obeidollah began his revolt. He had 
a great metaphysical and charismatic authority on his 
followers. His authority was due to his religious charisma, 
but some historians think that Obeidolla was a selfish and 
deceitful leader who abused people’s religious appertains. 
In this respect, the Author of Sheikh Obeidollah Biography 
writes: “Now and then, Sheikh Obeidollah put somebody 
in his father’s tomb (Sheikh Taher) then, he stood in front 
of the tomb and pretended to discuss with his father, and 
he motivated people by saying, “Sheikh Taher told me to 
gather tribes and attack Iran to get its government in order 
to prevail justice and God and Prophet Mohammad’s 
instructions”. Then, Obeidollah  stimulated tribes and 
people by the declaration of Holy War and his rule was 
spread in the entire region (Borzoei, 1999).
By using his charismatic characteristics Obeidolla 
tried to unite Iranian and Turkish Kurdistan. His revolts 
were based on three bases: economic, class and religious 
motivations. One of his personal economic motivations 
in his opposition to the Iranian government was that 
Iranian officials tended to take possession of his personal 
properties and also levy taxes on his lands. Besides, 
since he was Sunni, he had many reasons to oppose with 
Qajarieh government. He mobilized Sunni Kurds against 
government forces and also made them to attack the 
Ottoman Empire. Western historians such as Minorsky, 
Nikitin and Kochera considered Obeidollah as “the father 
of Kurdish and Iranian Kurdish nationalism” But no valid 
document exists to prove this claim. 
Sheikh Obeidollah by his appealing religious charisma 
and supports of British and Ottoman, attacked Iranian 
frontiers, and simultaneously, under British influence, 
he was fighting with Ottoman and on the other hand 
he fought against Russia in defence of the  Ottoman 
Empire. Sheikh Obiedollah for two reasons took part in 
Ottoman war against Russia actively. Firstly, he has the 
same religion as the  Ottoman Empire (Sunni). Secondly, 
his religious commitment, supporting Muslims against 
Non-Muslims, impelled him to participate in this war 
(Borzoei, 1999, pp.55-58). Then, ideological anarchism 
can be best title for his movement. As it was about Simko, 
Obeidollah’s movement was directed by Britain as an 
exogenous factor.  Since it was not rooted in the local and 
endogenous context, he was defeated by the  Ottoman 
Empire. This judgement can be right about another 
movement of Turkish Kurds by Sheikh Said Piran. In this 
context, both Sheikh Said Piran and Sheikh Obeidollah 
Nahri are evaluated as neither purely religious nor purely 
nationalist. In fact the important difference between 
Iranian and Turkish Kurds movements was religion factor. 
The Turkish Kurds’ movements were affected by religion 
and most of their political leaders were religious ones but 
the Iranian Kurds’ leaders were tribal and feudalist ones. 
On the other hand, religion played a significant role in 
failure of Kurdish political movements in Turkey. Since 
the Kurdish movement leaders had common religion 
with the  Ottoman Empire, in final stance, there were 
some religious considerations that prevented success of 
these movements. This factor exhausted revolutionary 
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potentials and provided some difficulties to choose 
between nationalism and Islamism as this was a case 
about Obeidollah’s war against Russia in defence of the 
Ottoman Empire, while Ottoman was an old enemy of 
Kurdish /Sunni nationalism.
9 .  I R A Q I  K U R D I S TA N ,  K U R D I S H 
NATIONALISM AND SHEIKH MAHMOOD 
BARZENJI
In the late 19th century and first half of 20th century many 
political movements occurred in Kurdish society as a 
whole. They were created at once but they had the same 
relative characteristics. Being directed under the same 
political and ideological circumstances, the tribal-feudal 
origins, externally-directed nature and quick destruction 
were main the particularities of them.
In 20th century Iraqi Kurdistan, the most important 
socio-political movement was by Sheikh Mahmood 
Barzenji. Of its religious nature and foreign intervention, 
it was the same as Sheikh Nahri’s and Sheikh Said’s 
movements. In fact the religious factor is a key concept 
to study the late 19th century and first half of 20th century 
movements of Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. The most basic 
reason is that the religious sects such as Ghaderieh and 
Naghshbandieh had rooted historically in this region. This 
religious system is transformed into the tribal-feudalist 
property system and mixed with the political structure. 
Sheikh Mahmood Barzenji like Nahri and Piran was from 
such a religious sect family.
After the First World War and after Ottoman was 
divided, Shiekh Mahmood Barzenji started his efforts 
to make Kurdistan independent. He came to the throne 
as the first king of Iraqi Kurdistan. But he was defeated 
soon (Molla, 2001, p.44). In the first stage, Sheikh 
Mahmood was raised by British and was appointed as 
a Sulaymaniyah ruler. In this respect Britain’s purpose 
was to erect a government under its domination and also 
to create a political, national and ethnical enemy for 
Turkey because Turkey was claiming to restore southern 
Kurdish provinces of Iraq as its historical territory. The 
Iraqi Kurdistan was and is one of the great oil resources. 
Therefore, the British interests were being imperilled by 
Turkey. 
British control of the southern parts of Kurdistan made 
the Kurds feel ever more optimistic as they perceived 
the British, in particular, to be their saviours from the 
Ottoman or other countries. The events in 1919 illustrated 
how premature Kurdish optimism was (Eskandar, 2000, 
p.162). In the beginning of Barzenenji Movement, Sheikh 
Mahmood played a significant role in shaping early 
British-Kurdish relations, by virtue of his outstanding 
religious position as a head of the Ghaderieh Sufi Sect and 
his social position as a landlord aristocrat. On the eve of 
the First World War Mahmood made his first contact with 
European powers via mixed British-Russian boundary 
commission which attempted to resolve outstanding 
boundary dispute between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Persian kingdom (Eskandar, 2000, pp.141-142). As it 
was said Sheikh Mahmood was appointed as a governor 
of Sulaymaniyah by Britain. He tried to build a united 
Kurdistan and tried to expand his territory without 
British support and interference. Since he pronounced 
himself as a leader of independent kingdom of Kurdistan 
and separated his goals from British, he was attacked 
by British-Iraq armies and was beaten. When Sheikh 
Mahmood was called to court, he said about his purposes 
and ambiguous role of Britain in Southern Kurdistan: 
I concluded a contract with you just according to my nation’s 
request and to get freedom for my nation. I permitted you to 
enter our region provided that you are guarantor of this freedom. 
You lied; you had bad intentions in your mind. It was in my 
line of duty to prevent your abuse because I was my nation’s 
representative. You behaved so negatively that there remained 
nothing more than war for us. Right now, I am your captive and 
I do not expect my enemy and my nation’s enemy to forgive me; 
I am ready to die in sake of my nation. (Molla Omar Isa, 2001, 
p.44)
As this written statement shows, the British had a 
great and determinant role in the  rise and fall of Kurdish 
political movements in all parts of Kurdistan, Iran, Iraq 
and Turkey. Therefore this short introduction on Brazenji 
nationalist effort will prove our idea about remarkable 
role of exogenous forces in political Movement-making 
in Kurdistan in 19th and 20th centuries. Let us theorise and 
discuss these debates according to our theoretical model 
to reach a general conclusion.
10.  CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHAT 
HAVE KURDS DONE? 
In this short study, we tried to demarcate our area of 
interest, then, we constructed an organisational model to 
describe and explicate how organisational factors could 
historically affect the political Movement-making in 
Kurdistan. Therefore, we proffered a brief description 
on historical and political rising and purposes of main 
movements, and documented them by referring to reliable 
resources. 
According to the contingency theory, the exogenous 
forces such as foreign contingent impacts have been 
the most important factors in shaping, reshaping and 
directing of Kurdish movements but all the factors that 
have an effect on Kurdistan were not political. They can 
be categorised in three levels; Macro level including 
exogenous factors, Meso level, containing socio-
economic factors such as tribal-feudalism and regionalism 
and Micro Level, composed of cultural factors including 
illiteracy and cultural poverty. Exogenous Forces (political 
conditions) are the most determinant factor. In summery, 
the combination of these levels prevented creation of 
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political endeavour of the Kurds. Political forces directed 
by external pressures were critical but since these forces 
were not corresponded with other dimensions and levels, 
it led to wastage of historical potential of the Kurds to 
transform their ethnical identity to political practices. 
Regionalism; small and limited size of political and 
military groups, lack of modern technology (weapon and 
program) are other factors that played an important role 
in this trend. As it was said, this theory can explain just a 
part of reality and other theories will be able to make clear 
other parts.
The Population ecology theory, in contrast, considers 
political movements of the Kurds in the general 
environmental context, by using another perspective. 
The Kurdish political movements could not fulfil 
environmental needs. Their actions were performed 
in particular-small regions and in limited range and 
were based on ethnical and regional ideology. Since 
the environment required a greater, wider and stronger 
movement, it tended to fail all the limited and unnecessary 
ones. Then according to this theory political Kurdistan 
movements were regional and non-political because they 
did not want and could not be able to unite all Kurdish 
regions, parts, sects and ideologies. According to this 
theory, the Kurds could have adapted to the environment 
successfully if they had been able to compete; but they 
struggled and did not survive.  In fact, the population 
ecology theory regards human issues as a natural selection 
and condemns all social entities that can not compete. 
Generally, this theory gives us two principle rules, which 
are as follows:
(a) In the political struggle the Kurds could not 
compete and fulfil their environmental obligations.
(b) They were not able to adapt to their environment to 
sustain their own entity and identity.
We believe that there were many factors that 
culminated Kurds not to be successful and adaptive. These 
factors were naturally political.
The political climate in Kurdistan in the studied 
period was a combination of three main factors, the 
exogenous forces (EF), the states and the ethnics (tribes). 
These political factors were constraining each other. 
Each of them was influenced by the other two. The EF 
was pressuring the states and the ethnic groups. In the 
same way it was influenced by the states and the ethnic 
groups simultaneously. The ethnic groups were also under 
pressure from the states as well. In brief there was a kind 
of threefold the mutual relationship. The ethnics (Kurds) 
lacked any technology and integrated ideology. They had 
fragmented in tribally regional divisions. Generally it 
could be claimed that they were suffering in three ways; 
the pressure of the states, the exogenous forces, and 
the internal pressures (tribal-feudalism- regionalism). 
Therefore it was very predictable that the Kurds would 
become political losers.
To compete or to sustain in the natural selection, the 
Kurds must have had two opportunities. On the one hand, 
they must have been equal in access to scarce resources 
such as technology, international consideration or political 
consciousness, and on the other hand, they must have had 
a socially, economically and politically integrated society 
(community). They must have been equipped with united 
ethnic identity—ideology, social solidarity, spontaneous 
political action and hen-tribalism. Since they did not 
provide themselves with these two factors, they were 
defeated.
The Institutionalisation Theory (IT) turns its attention 
to Kurdish political movement in another distinctive way. 
In this perspective, an important point is that why the 
Kurdish political endeavours during its long history did 
not become institutionalised. In fact this theory draws 
our attention to institutional Macro-Micro obstacles of 
Kurdish political efforts which led to their fast rise and 
fast failure. According to our findings and regarding to IT 
theoretical implications, Kurdish political efforts can be 
explained as follows: The Kurdish movements remained 
in the habitualization process and did not objectify their 
efforts to institutionalise their political ideology. Kurd 
leaders were composed of homogenous actors, namely, 
tribal–feudal or religious–feudal leaders that originated 
from various regional and territorial contexts. In other 
words, Kurdish leaders were those who searched for their 
own political and tribal interests along with quasi-national 
ideology while Kurdistan in that period demanded a 
variety of intellectual and political elites to be equipped 
with national and trans-regional ideology to follow 
Kurdish political interests and to compete with other 
political forces.
Kurdish leaders did not constitute real nationalism. 
They frequently attempted to compromise with exogenous 
factors. Therefore, a kind of imitation or low initiative 
process appears among these movements. Kurdish leaders 
used old-tested ways of trusting on exogenous factors 
and repeated the past mistakes frequently. Kurds’ real 
nationalism has never been imitated by Kurdish leaders 
satisfactorily. It has had regional and territorial motivation 
as all regions or tribes claimed to be independent. Besides, 
it was naturally encouraged and stimulated more and 
more by external constraints and Kurdish leaders brought 
into the scene old ways of relying on external supports. 
Finally, these external supports had culminated in failure 
and frustration of Kurdish movements. Furthermore, the 
lack of theorisation process to find an appropriate way 
to compete or struggle accelerated the failure of these 
movements. 
Dependency perspective considers general resources 
that Kurds had depended on. By using this theory, we 
can conclude that there have been several resources, 
which Kurdish leaders appealed to in the late 19th century 
and first half of 20th century. They can be divided into 
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two general segments: external resources including 
exogenous forces, that we discussed earlier and internal 
resources including endogenous factors such as tribal, 
regional and religious supports. It should be asserted 
that none of these resources were able to meet Kurdish 
political requirements; exogenous forces were temporal 
determinants that played their role according to their own 
economic and political logic. On the one hand, they were 
compromising with the Kurds to grant them their rights 
and on the other hand, by negotiating with the states, they 
began to undermine Kurdish movements. Their positions 
were vague and ambivalent and oriented toward their 
political grants, as it was about MR. Endogenous forces 
such as tribalism and religious supports wasted political 
potential in challenging with the states. Tribe chiefs 
were land-territory-oriented and they easily betrayed 
each other. Moreover religious origins of many Kurdish 
political leaders made Kurdish leaders to compromise 
with their historical enemies against their foreign enemies 
as it was about Obeidollah and Sheikh Said in Turkey. 
Then, according to the resource dependency theory, 
organisational structure of Kurdish movements was 
unstable and incoherent because their resources depended 
on those who were in oscillation and were unconfident 
and changeable.
As it mentioned, each theory was able to explain one 
or some aspects of political movements in Kurdistan. 
Also it became specified that they can provide us with 
a synthetic model, as a new sociological persuasion to 
discuss the political studies without being involved in 
mere political debates. Unfortunately, the performed 
studies related to the Kurdish political problem have 
always headed to some historical tales or personal 
actions. There are only few studies that have drawn their 
attention to socio-anthropological factors. There is an 
explicit demand to use a scientific sociological vision 
and to avoid mere and simple political justifications and 
arguments. 
To conclude, the theoretical discussion is summarized 
as follows:
The Contingency Theory can be an explanatory 
analytical model that regards exogenous and endogenous 
critical factors as structural obstacles in the process of 
political movement-making and considers macro, mesa 
and micro levels of analysis.
The population ecology concentrated on the Kurdish 
political ideology, action to compete, struggle or adapt 
with political environments. According to this theory, the 
Kurds could have adapted to the environment successfully 
if they had been able to compete; but they struggled and 
did not survive.  
The Institutional Theory focused on why the Kurdish 
ideology was not able to realize in a form of institutionally 
stable structure and to objectify its identity as a formal 
configuration. It argued that habitualisation, composition 
of Kurd leaders of regional actors, imitated ideology and 
lack of theoretical and conceptual theorisation led to this 
situation. 
Resource dependency theory claimed that historical 
trends in political actions of the Kurds have often been 
dependent on the unstable and ambivalent exogenous and 
endogenous resources. To get to their goals, Kurds should 
separate themselves from socio-political dependency and 
try to be self-dependent.
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